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Abstract
This article examines how religious afﬁliation shapes support for European Union membership.
While previous research has shown that Protestants are typically more eurosceptic than Catholics,
little is known about the nature of this relationship: speciﬁcally, whether religion affects one’s
utilitarian assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of membership, or one’s affective attachment to
the EU. Using the 2016 British Election Study Referendum Panel, this article shows that religious
afﬁliation inﬂuences both sets of attitudes, suggesting that the values and shared history associated
with one’s religion shapes how a voter perceives the performance of the EU in delivering its policy
objectives, and its operation as a legitimate institution. Moreover, some ﬁndings from previous
research are challenged: Protestants are not as uniﬁed in their scepticism of the EU as is widely
assumed, and the positive relationship between Catholicism and support for EU integration is
not apparent in the UK.
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Introduction
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union presented a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge to the progress of EU integration, and prompted expectations amongst eurosceptic
politicians in Italy, Germany, Denmark and France that they could be next to leave.
Explaining individual level euroscepticism, and how UK voters arrived at their decision,
is important for not only understanding why such a challenge has occurred, but also to
consider what could lead voters in other member states to demand similar referenda, or
complete withdrawal from the EU, in the future. Most explanations for the ‘Brexit vote’
focus on national identity, economic deprivation, hostility to immigration and political
alienation (see Clarke et al., 2017; Curtice, 2017; Fox and Pearce, 2018). Religious belief
and afﬁliation play minor roles, despite the historic links between religion and many
political parties central to the development of the EU (Bochel and Denver, 1970) and
the effect of religion on many political attitudes, including euroscepticism (see
Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Nelsen and Guth, 2003, 2015; Nelsen et al., 2011; Tilley,
2015). Previous studies identify signiﬁcant variation in political attitudes between
different denominations of Christianity – by far the largest religious group in Europe –
in addition to differences between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ groups. While the mag-
nitude of these differences is smaller than those associated with more common predictors
* We would like to express our gratitude to the anonymous referees, as well as to the organizers and participants of the 2017
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Annual Conference, the 2017 Annual Conference of the Wales Institute of Social &
Economic Research, Data & Methods, and the 2018 Political Studies Association Annual Conference for providing
feedback on draft versions of this paper, all of which improved it a great deal. Any errors are the responsibility of the
authors alone.
JCMS 2019 pp. 1–19 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12836
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
of euroscepticism, any comprehensive explanation of public support for EU membership
and integration cannot overlook religion.
There has been limited progress in explaining how religion inﬂuences attitudes towards
European integration. It is unclear whether the fact that Protestants are typically more
eurosceptic than Catholics stems from their assessment that the costs of EU integration
and membership outweigh its beneﬁts, or from their lack of affective attachment to the
EU. Additionally, the robustness of causal frameworks is hindered by over-dependence
on cross-sectional data. Finally, few studies have been able to explore any but the largest
denominations of Christians, because of limited sample sizes from smaller groups (such
as Methodists). This article addresses some of these shortcomings and provides a more nu-
anced analysis of how Christian religious afﬁliation affects support for EU membership.
First, it adopts a more nuanced conceptualization of euroscepticism, which recognizes
the distinction between ‘utilitarian’ and ‘affective’ support for EU integration (Lindberg
and Scheingold, 1970). Second, it uses the 2016 British Election Study (BES) Referen-
dum Panel, which was collected before and after the referendum on the UK’s EU mem-
bership, when the issue of European integration was most salient. The use of panel data
allows a well-speciﬁed causal model to measure the impact of religious afﬁliation on util-
itarian and affective support, and the impact of those on vote choice in the referendum.
Finally, the large sample of the BES means that several Christian denominations can be
studied, taking the analysis beyond a simplistic Protestant vs. Catholic dichotomy.
The analyses show signiﬁcant effects on euroscepticism from association with differ-
ent denominations, and that this reﬂects the effect of religion on both utilitarian and affec-
tive dimensions of support. As argued in previous literature, some Protestant groups tend
to be particularly eurosceptic; however, there is considerable variation between them
depending on their historic relationship with the national government and/or conceptions
of national identity. Protestants who have traditionally had a strong connection to notions
of UK national identity, such as Anglicans, are the most eurosceptic, while those that have
been marginalized or persecuted by the state in the past are more supportive of the EU,
possibly viewing it as a means by which their distinctive identity can be protected. In a
further challenge to existing literature, Catholicism was not associated with greater sup-
port for EU membership in the UK once respondents’ country of birth was accounted for.
The article does not only conﬁrm, therefore, that religion is an important determinant of
individual-level support for EU integration, but also illustrates the wider signiﬁcance of re-
ligious afﬁliation in shaping political attitudes. Existing theories of support for European in-
tegration and the inﬂuence of religion in politics suggest that religious identity should
primarily affect one’s long-term values and attachment to the EU and one’s national com-
munity – in other words, it should inﬂuence affective support for the EU. Our ﬁndings
show, however, that religion affects both affective identiﬁcation with the EU and voters’
short-term assessments of its performance and competence. It not only shapes the way that
voters relate to their national and regional communities and the EU, but also their political
agendas and expectations, and consequently, their assessment of how successful the EU has
been in promoting their interests. The inﬂuence of religion on attitudes towards the EU is
more extensive and widespread than current theories suggest, and may well be more wide-
spread than is commonly assumed in relation to other political traits as well.
The next section of this article reviews the literature on the relationship between reli-
gion (primarily Christianity) and euroscepticism, outlining the current theories and the
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shortcomings resulting from limitations in available survey data. The article then outlines
the research design before results are presented. The conclusion summarizes the ﬁndings
and considers their implications for the future study of public support for EU integration.
I. Literature Review
It is often claimed that as societies industrialize, religious habits gradually erode and peo-
ple become indifferent to spiritual appeals, meaning religious attitudes have little impact
on social and political values and decisions (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This closely
follows Lipset and Rokkan’s argument that, over the last two centuries, politics in
Europe has been shaped by the secular-clerical cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967),
and that religion has gradually lost ground to secularism – even though the levels of sec-
ularization vary (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). In Britain, for example, religion (primarily
the divide between Catholics and Protestants) was considered a major predictor of polit-
ical behaviour until World War I (Wald, 1983). However, the declining number of people
associating with the Christian church and of practicing Christians made it look increas-
ingly irrelevant, especially alongside the rising membership of trade unions and the grow-
ing signiﬁcance of social class (Butler and Stokes, 1969). This undermined the perceived
importance of religion in Britain (see Rose and McAllister, 1986), and all but erased it
from most contemporary analyses of electoral behaviour.
However, asserting the dominance of secular social cleavages and dropping religion
altogether seems premature considering the historic links between key political and
religious institutions in European democracies, and evidence of the importance of reli-
gious beliefs and background in shaping political attitudes and behaviours. In the UK,
for example, the Conservative Party was historically very close to the Church of England,
and the Liberal and Labour parties had roots in the traditions of dissenting Protestants and
Catholics, relationships that continue to inform the ideology of those parties (Bochel and
Denver, 1970). Similarly, in Germany, the Christian Democratic Union – a key political
party in the foundation and development of the EU (Nelsen and Guth, 2003) – has strong
roots in both the Catholic and Protestant Christian traditions of civic and social values.
Furthermore, while formal religious practice such as service attendance is declining,
new facets of religious identity are emerging that continue to hold sway over individuals’
broader social and political beliefs (Davie, 1994). Identiﬁcation with a certain religious
group is no longer necessarily determined through engagement in religious practice, but
can be based on shared socio-cultural values and experiences, moral principles and codes
of behaviour (Beckford, 2003). This shared identity, and the social network, beliefs and
values that underpin it, can have considerable inﬂuence over an individual’s political at-
titudes and behaviour (Gutmann, 2003). Finally, religion still inﬂuences voter decisions.
Tilley (2015) has demonstrated that even if a growing number of voters do not afﬁliate
themselves with a particular religion, their parents and grandparents are more likely to
do so, and they pass on the values, beliefs and shared history of their respective religions
to their children during socialization. This means that religious groups can shape the
political attitudes and values even of those who do not identify with them through family
networks. These processes help to explain the continuing relationship between identiﬁca-
tion with religious groups and support for more conservative political ideologies and
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political parties, as well as vote choice in elections (Clements, 2015; Esmer and
Pettersson, 2007; Tilley, 2015).
II. Religion and Euroscepticism
While research on the effect of identifying with a non-Christian religion on
euroscepticism is rare (primarily because of the limited numbers of non-Christians in
social surveys), numerous studies have shown signiﬁcant differences between Christian
denominations (Nelsen et al., 2011; Nelsen and Guth, 2003, 2017; Scherer, 2015).
Catholics, for example, tend to be more supportive of EU integration than Protestants.
Religious afﬁliation also shapes attitudes related to support for European integration, such
as towards immigration or authoritarian values (Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009), and na-
tional identity (McLaren, 2002). Explanations for this relationship fall within two broad
theories. The ﬁrst focuses on the shared history of different Christian groups and their re-
lationship with the Catholic Church and national governments, while the second con-
siders the overlap between Christian values and beliefs and the political values that
underpin the EU and its forebears.
Catholicism has historically been associated with membership of a community that
transcends national borders and is overseen by a supra-national institution that constrains
the sovereignty of national governments. While the EU is relatively young (compared
with the Catholic Church), it nonetheless shares these characteristics with regard to policy
areas in which integration has led it to take a leading role, and so reﬂects a political ar-
rangement many Catholics are supportive of (Madeley, 2007; Nelsen and Guth, 2003).
In addition, the international nature of Catholicism leads Catholics to recognize them-
selves as members of a borderless, international community (Nelsen et al., 2011).
There is also overlap between the values of Catholicism and the nature of EU integra-
tion. It has been argued that European integration has a distinctly ‘Catholic nature’, which
reﬂects the ‘traditional idea of a uniﬁed moral leadership… safeguarding Christian values
under the power of a central authority’ (Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009, p. 1243). Many
of the ideals promoted by supporters of EU integration have clear overlaps with the values
that lay at the heart of Catholic beliefs and ideal lifestyle, such as charity, peace and social
justice (Madeley, 2007; Nelsen and Guth, 2003). Indeed, the original objectives of the
European Coal and Steel Community included securing peace in Europe, and subsequent
EU treaties and policies have emphasized its commitment to charity and social democratic
visions of social justice (Coupland, 2004; Madeley, 2007). This overlap is also reﬂected
in the fact that the European project has traditionally been led and strongly supported by
political parties with strong links to Catholic values, such as Germany’s Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) (Madeley, 2007; Nelsen and Guth, 2015). Overall, therefore,
Catholics are expected to be more supportive of the EU as a political institution, and more
likely to view EU membership as beneﬁcial to both the global Catholic community and
the promotion of Catholic values, resulting in them being more supportive of EU mem-
bership and integration.
Protestants, in contrast, have historically been dependent upon strong and independent
national governments to assure their protection from the dominance and persecution of
the Catholic Church and its allies (Nelsen and Guth, 2015; Scherer, 2015). They have a
historic interest in protecting the sovereignty and independence of the nation state, and
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suspicion of a supra-national institution constraining that sovereignty. The concessions to
national sovereignty required by EU membership are, consequently, unappealing to many
Protestants; as Coupland (2004) points out, many Protestants’ euroscepticism originated
in their concerns that European integration would lead to Catholic dominance.
In addition, while the values espoused by the EU and the notion of transnational citi-
zenship are a source of support for integration amongst Catholics, the opposite is true for
Protestants, many of whom are suspicious of the promotion of universalist values because
of the potential impact on the distinct identity and beliefs of their church (Scherer, 2015).
This is particularly apparent amongst members of churches that have historically played a
prominent role in the articulation of national identity (such as the Church of England).
For them, any challenge to national identity or the distinctiveness of the national govern-
ment can be an indirect challenge to the distinctiveness and identity of their church
(McLeod, 1999).
Not all Protestant churches, however, have the same close relationships with national
governments or the same investment in national identity. In the UK, groups of Protestants
broke away from the Church of England in the 17th century because of disagreements
over the interpretation of scripture and religious practice, forming new churches such as
the Baptist and Presbyterian (Tombs, 2014). They were followed by Methodists in the
18th century. These ‘non-conformists’ were persecuted for failing to adhere to the state
religion of England represented by the Anglican Church. Hence, while they share many
of the values of larger Protestant churches that differentiate them from Catholicism
(such as a rejection of the Papacy, the Catholic Church and their universalist values), their
relationships with national governments and the nation-state have been far more confron-
tational. Consequently, they are expected to be more hostile to EU membership than
Catholics, although their weaker, historical attachment to the nation-state and national
governments may mean that they are not quite as eurosceptic as members of the Church
of England, for example. Their more localized nature and attachment to smaller commu-
nity identities may make them relatively more supportive of the EU, if they perceive that
their distinctive identity can be protected and promoted by EU policies.
In the context of the UK’s referendum on EU membership, therefore, we expect
Catholics to be the most pro-remain given their historic relationship with transnational insti-
tutions, and the overlap between their beliefs and those represented in EU integration and
espoused by the EU. Protestants should be more eurosceptic and so more likely to support
Brexit, though the smaller groups that do not have the same historic attachment to the
nation-state or English/Scottish/Welsh national identity should be less so. This provides H1:
H1. Anglicans are more likely to vote ‘leave’ than Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians,
who are in turn more likely to vote ‘leave’ than Catholics.
III. Religion and Dimensions of Support for the EU
To capture the complexity of support for EU membership, it is useful to distinguish
between ‘utilitarian’ and ‘affective’ support (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). It reﬂects
the distinction between speciﬁc (utilitarian) and diffuse (affective) support for a
political institution (Easton, 1975), and between input- and output-oriented legitimacy
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(Down and Wilson, 2017; Scharpf, 1999). Although Wessels identiﬁed three (2007) and
Boomgaarden et al. (2011) ﬁve such dimensions, a dichotomous utilitarian-affective dis-
tinction is sufﬁcient to separate evaluations of the beneﬁts of EU membership from more
deeply held sentiments (Down and Wilson, 2017).
Utilitarian support is output-oriented and reﬂects an individual’s cost–beneﬁt analysis
of EU membership and their evaluation of its performance in delivering policy goals.
An individual who feels that the beneﬁts of membership outweigh the costs, and that
the EU delivers on its policy objectives, is more likely to have high utilitarian support
for membership. It is reactive to indicators of the EU’s performance, such as the strength
of the economy, and so is relatively volatile (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Down and
Wilson, 2017). Affective support is input-oriented and based on more deep-seated
attachments to the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Such attachments evolve more
slowly and reﬂect one’s fundamental beliefs and values about the EU as an institution.
The failure of the EU to deliver a strong economy, for example, is less important than
its adherence to the ideal of a worthy institution for this dimension of support (Down
and Wilson, 2017).
The relationship between religious afﬁliation and support for EU integration is rooted
primarily in the historic relationship between the Catholic and Protestant churches and
national governments, as well as the values and beliefs regarding politics, religion and
community held by various Christian denominations. This means that religion should
have a stronger impact on affective support for integration. An individual’s religious
afﬁliation is expected to shape the level of their affective attachment towards the EU.
In other words, the historic relationships between Christian churches and the EU and
national governments, the perceived overlap between their values, and the EU’s role in
promoting or challenging religious and national identity are expected to shape the affec-
tive assessments individuals form regarding the legitimacy and worthiness of the EU as a
political institution, as shown in H2:
H2. Catholics have stronger affective attachment to the EU than Baptists, Methodists and
Presbyterians, who in turn have stronger affective attachments than Anglicans.
On the other hand, religion is not expected to have a signiﬁcant effect on utilitarian
support. There is little reason to believe that members of different denominations are
likely to assess the policy performance of the EU in areas such as promoting economic
prosperity or reducing conﬂict differently because of their religious beliefs once the im-
pact of their affective support for integration has been controlled for.
This provides H3:
H3. There is no effect from religious afﬁliation on utilitarian support for EU membership.
Finally, representing the expectation that the effect of religious afﬁliation on affective
support for integration is the cause of the relationship between religious afﬁliation and
euroscepticism:
H4. There are no signiﬁcant differences between religious groups’ support for ‘leave’ once
affective assessments have been accounted for.
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IV. Research Design
This study uses the BES Referendum Panel waves 7–9 (collected online between April
and July 2016) to study the effect of afﬁliation with a Christian denomination on respon-
dents’ utilitarian and affective attitudes towards the EU, and subsequently on their support
for Brexit. Support for Brexit is taken as a behavioural expression of euroscepticism,
which is in turn expected to be largely (though not exclusively) caused by individual
attitudes towards the EU and EU membership. The UK’s referendum is currently the only
instance in which a large sample from a range of Christian denominations were surveyed
regarding their attitudes towards EU membership and integration. The BES Referendum
Panel is the only source of panel data that allows causal relationships between religion
and eurosceptic attitudes (and for the potentially delayed impact of causal factors to be
accounted for) to be explored in such a context. It is not, of course, a typical circumstance
in which to study attitudes towards EU integration, as the UK is a particularly eurosceptic
member state (Down and Wilson, 2017; Nelsen and Guth, 2003), and the referendum was
the ﬁrst of its kind since that in Greenland in 1979. Furthermore, the campaign was par-
ticularly heated and dominated public debate, thus making the issue of EU membership
unusually salient for voters. That said, these data can provide a reliable indication of
the ‘normal’ relationship between religious afﬁliation and euroscepticism in the EU:
i) There is no reason to believe that the campaign had a distinctive effect on religious
citizens – indeed, religion was all but absent from the public debate;
ii) Studies of the correlates of support for Brexit and euroscepticism support the assump-
tion that voting ‘leave’ in the referendum is a behavioural manifestation of
euroscepticism (Clarke et al., 2017; Curtice, 2017);
iii) The correlates of euroscepticism – including religious afﬁliation – are similar across
member states (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Nelsen and Guth, 2017), which makes the
conclusions of this study to some extent applicable beyond the UK.The dataset
includes a sample of 62,763 individual responses, including data about personal
characteristics, political attitudes and behaviour, and support for EU membership.
The main dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent
supported ‘leave’ in the Referendum (wave 9 of the BES). The analyses also use
two exogenous dependent variables measuring utilitarian and affective support for
EU membership.
Utilitarian support is captured through a composite measure of responses to six ques-
tions regarding views of the political and policy successes of the EU (waves 7 and 8).
They include respondents’ agreement with the view that the EU has prevented war in
Europe, made Britain more prosperous, brought people from different EU countries closer
together, undermined the powers of the UK Parliament, created more red tape for busi-
ness, and allowed too many members to join. These variables were recoded to be posi-
tively correlated, and latent structure analysis conﬁrmed that they indicate the same
latent construct.1 The scores were combined into a composite indicator, in which higher
scores imply a more positive utilitarian assessment of EU membership.
1See online Technical Appendix for details.
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There are no direct measures in the BES of respondents’ assessments of the legitimacy
of the EU or of trust in it, which are typically used as indicators of affective attachment
(Down and Wilson, 2017). Following Boomgaarden et al. (2011), we use a scale of
self-identiﬁcation as ‘European’ (with data collected in waves 7, 8 and 9). Like political
trust, identiﬁcation with political institutions is a stable trait (Down and Wilson, 2017).
Self-identiﬁcation as ‘European’ is indicative of a stable, positive attachment to the EU
described by the affective dimensions of support. As expected of such a measure, the
correlation between European identiﬁcation (on a scale from 0 to 7, with 7 indicating
‘very strong European’) and support for Brexit is 0.69. Owing to the well-established
argument that European and national identities tend to be positively correlated (Bruter,
2003), our measure captures the intensity of feeling ‘European’ independently from other
facets of national or ethnic identity, thus, allowing them to vary independently and
accounting for the possibility of multiple political identities.
The key independent variable is respondents’ self-reported religious afﬁliation
(measured in waves 7, 8 and 9). There were sufﬁcient numbers identifying as Anglican
(Church of England, Anglican or Episcopal), Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist
and Baptist to allow reliable analyses of them as separate groups. The sample sizes for
other groups (such as members of the United Reformed Church) were too small and, thus,
were coded as ‘Other Christians’. Respondents from non-Christian groups were also too
few for reliable analysis and were coded as ‘Non-Christians’. Those with no religious
afﬁliation served as the reference category.2 The research would have been aided further
with a measure of ‘religiosity’, which would have allowed for a distinction between prac-
ticing and non-practicing Christians. Although it is not available in this BES dataset, this
does not undermine the value of the analyses. The expectation is that by identifying as a
‘member’ of a particular religious denomination, respondents are likely to differ in their
values, identity and history they exhibit, which will shape their attitudes towards the EU.
The analyses were conducted on (long) panel data, pooling observations from Waves
7–9 of the BES and stacking them by wave (Wooldridge, 2013). The ﬁrst analysis used
random-effect logistic (Gaussian) regression models with cluster robust inference on the
dependent variable to estimate the effect of religious afﬁliation on the likelihood of voting
‘leave’ in the EU Referendum. The model controlled for characteristics associated with
individual-level euroscepticism, including age, ethnicity, attention to politics, political
ideology and party identiﬁcation (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Fox and Pearce, 2018;
Franklin et al., 1995; Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2002).3
The second set of analyses explored the effect of religious afﬁliation on utilitarian and
affective support for EU membership, using generalized least squares (GLM) random
effects models with cluster robust inference, with data taken from all three waves and in-
cluding the same controls. The ﬁnal analysis explored the effect of religious afﬁliation on
‘leave’ voting while controlling for utilitarian and affective support and controls. The
structure of the data and the nature of the independent variables, many of which are
time-invariant, meant that the analyses were best conducted using random effects, as long
as one can ‘plausibly assume the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory
variables’ (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 474–478). The speciﬁcations of our data closely ﬁt
2See online Appendix B for the percentages of respondents in each category and a comparison with the 2011 Census.
3See online Appendix C for the justiﬁcations and expectations of the control variables.
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the assumptions for using random effects models (Becketti, 2013). Given the large sample
size, the random effects estimators also have smaller standard errors than the correspond-
ing pooled OLS estimators (Wooldridge, 2013).
Clustering applied to the quasi-time-demeaned equation is used to get robust stan-
dard errors and test statistics. Cluster robust inference was applied to account for serial
correlation, which is common practice when the number of observations is much larger
than the number of time periods (Becketti, 2013). Finally, the data used in the models
were unweighted, ﬁrstly because the focus of the study is on assuring the internal
validity of relationships between religious afﬁliation and euroscepticism rather than
on generalizability, for which probability weights are less important. Secondly, such
weights can unnecessarily over-complicate models (Evans et al., 2016 ;Fieldhouse
et al., 2016; Gelman, 2007).
V. Analysis and Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics showing the vote preferences of respondents within
each religious group (and those of no religion) in the EU referendum.
The data show clear differences, with the most pro-EU by some margin those of no
religious afﬁliation (as well as those of non-Christian religion), with 56 per cent voting
‘remain’. Consistent with H1, the most pro-EU denomination were Catholics, 52 per cent
of whom voted ‘remain’, and by far the strongest supporters of Brexit were Anglicans, 60
per cent of whom voted ‘leave’. Presbyterians, Baptists and Methodists sat in between,
more or less evenly split, though the differences between them and Catholics is small.
Table 2 reports the analysis predicting support for Brexit for each religious group
while controlling for factors associated with euroscepticism (Model I).4 The control var-
iables had the anticipated effects: older, working class, white non-graduates and those
identifying with the eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) were more
supportive of Brexit. Those living in Scotland or born in another member state were more
likely to vote ‘remain’, though the effect is very small for the latter. Against the expecta-
tions of the literature, higher levels of political engagement (represented by attention to
politics and interest in the Referendum) did not affect vote choice.
With these controls accounted for, there was a strong, statistically signiﬁcant effect
from identifying as Anglican on the probability of voting ‘leave’, making them the most
eurosceptic group (supporting H1). While the effects from other denominations were not
signiﬁcant, the direction of the relationships was not entirely as expected. Contrary to the
expectation that Protestants would be more likely to support ‘leave’ than Catholics and
those with no religion, Baptists and Methodists were marginally more likely to support
‘remain’. In addition, against the expectation that Catholics should be more pro-EU, they
were more likely to support ‘leave’ than other groups except Anglicans.
Table 3 demonstrates the effect of religious afﬁliation on affective (Model II) and util-
itarian (Model III) support. Model II shows signiﬁcant differences between the groups’
affective attachments to the EU. Consistent with H2, Anglicans and Presbyterians had
the weakest attachment, whereby their religious afﬁliation decreased their affective
4Numerous formulations of the models were tested and assessed on the basis of ﬁt statistics and theory to determine the
most appropriate for testing the hypotheses. Different ways of modelling region were tested. For the most part, region
had no signiﬁcant effect once the other factors were controlled for, except for living in Scotland.
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Table 1: Referendum vote choice by religious afﬁliation
Religious Denomination Remain (%) Leave (%) Net Remain/Leave
None 56.6 43.0 13.6
Anglican 39.9 59.5 19.6
Roman Catholic 52.1 47.6 4.5
Presbyterian 50.8 48.7 2.1
Methodist 49.6 50.1 0.5
Baptist 49.3 49.4 0.1
Other Christian 48.1 51.8 3.7
Other religion 56.2 42.9 13.3
Source: BES Referendum Panel, Wave 9, weighted.
Even on the unweighted BES sample, the data closely resemble the distribution of votes for Leave/Remain recorded in the
2016 Referendum, over-estimating the Remain vote by only 2 per cent. Note: Figures do not add up to 100 per cent, because
of ‘don’t know’ responses to Wave 9.
Table 2: Religious denomination and vote in the EU Referendum
Vote ‘Leave’ in EU Referendum Model I
Coefﬁcient Standard Error
Religious group (None)
Anglican 1.20‡ 0.28
Catholic 0.79 0.42
Presbyterian 0.34 0.65
Methodist 0.75 0.81
Baptist 0.16 1.08
Other Christian 0.46 1.56
Non-Christian 0.67 0.49
Age 0.10‡ 0.01
Working class ID 0.75‡ 0.13
Female 0.27 0.23
EU-born 0.001* 0.000
Non-white British 2.04‡ 0.45
Graduate 3.63‡ 0.24
Left–right ideology 1.28‡ 0.07
Attention to politics 0.01 0.06
No interest in Referendum 2.38 1.33
Scotland 4.02‡ 0.36
Conservative ID 0.29 0.36
Labour ID 5.09‡ 0.35
Lib Dem ID 8.22‡ 0.46
UKIP ID 15.07‡ 0.85
Constant 8.90‡ 0.89
Obs 12,567
Groups 10,286
Wald chi2(16) 3,425.32
Log Likelihood 5,945.07
Source: BES, Wave 7–9.
* effect statistically signiﬁcant at 95% conﬁdence level; † signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence level; ‡ signiﬁcant at 99.9% con-
ﬁdence level.
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sentiment by coefﬁcients of 0.21 and0.19, respectively (both signiﬁcant). This sup-
ports the theory that the Protestant groups with the strongest attachments to a national
identity (English and Scottish) are more eurosceptic. The effects for Methodists and
Baptists were non-signiﬁcant, but matched expectations in showing these groups as sit-
ting between Anglicans and Catholics.
While the coefﬁcient for Catholics is non-signiﬁcant, once the control for being born in
another EU member state is removed from the model, the coefﬁcient increases substan-
tially and becomes signiﬁcant. This suggests that it is the fact that most Catholics were
born in other member states that is more important for explaining their opposition to
Brexit than their religious belief, challenging the theory of H2 that Catholics would be
the most affectively supportive group. This suggests that afﬁliation with the Catholic
Church in Britain drives more negative assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of EU mem-
bership and undermines affective attachment to the institution somewhat.
Table 3: Utilitarian and affective support for EU membership
Model II (DV=affective) Model III (DV= utilitarian)
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Religious group (None)
Anglican 0.21‡ 0.04 0.41‡ 0.09
Catholic 0.06 0.63 0.32* 0.15
Presbyterian 0.19* 0.09 0.59† 0.19
Methodist 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.22
Baptist 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.32
Other Christian 0.10 0.18 0.17 0.38
Non-Christian 0.21* 0.08 0.32 0.17
Age 0.004‡ 0.001 0.04‡ 0.00
Working class ID 0.16‡ 0.02 0.34‡ 0.05
Female 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.08
EU-born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-white British 0.49‡ 0.07 0.80‡ 0.16
Graduate 0.59‡ 0.03 1.16‡ 0.08
Left–right ideology 0.16‡ 0.01 0.55‡ 0.02
Attention to politics 0.09‡ 0.01 0.13‡ 0.02
No interest in Referendum 0.23 0.13 0.96† 0.36
Scotland 0.011* 0.05 0.74‡ 0.12
Conservative ID 0.12* 0.05 0.24* 0.12
Labour ID 0.47‡ 0.05 1.13‡ 0.12
Lib Dem ID 0.84‡ 0.06 2.13‡ 0.17
UKIP ID 0.84‡ 0.06 1.59‡ 0.13
Constant 3.31‡ 0.13 14.87‡ 0.31
Obs 13,160 11,689
Groups 10,717 9,625
Wald chi2(16) 3,191.93 4,318.07
Source: BES, Wave 7–9.
* effect statistically signiﬁcant at 95% conﬁdence level; † signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence level; ‡ signiﬁcant at 99.9% con-
ﬁdence level.
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Model III shows that, against the expectations of H3, afﬁliations with the Church of
England, the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Catholic Church substantively
decreased one’s approval of the EU’s policy performance – with coefﬁcients of 0.41,
0.59 and0.32, respectively (all statistically signiﬁcant). The coefﬁcient for Method-
ists of 0.15 suggested they had a lower utilitarian support than the non-religious and
Baptists, but was non-signiﬁcant. The model suggests that the groups with the most
utilitarian support for EU membership are Baptists, Methodists, ‘other Christians’, non-
Christians and the non-religious. While Catholics were more positive in their assessments
than Presbyterians and Anglicans, they were more sceptical than other Protestants, and
considerably more so than those with no religious afﬁliation. A further surprising ﬁnding
is that Presbyterians were more critical than Anglicans. The vast majority of Presbyterians
live in Scotland, which was overwhelmingly opposed to Brexit during the Referendum,
but since the model controls for living in Scotland, this is not a regional effect.
Table 3 also contains important results relating to the effects of the control variables.
Those with more economic resources and human capital (in the form of working in mid-
dle class occupations and having a degree) had higher utilitarian and affective support,
likely reﬂecting their greater capacity to take advantage of the economic opportunities
of EU membership and not to ﬁnd themselves in competition with migrants for low
skilled jobs (Gabel, 1998). There was no signiﬁcant effect from gender, while those from
minority ethnic backgrounds were signiﬁcantly more supportive of EU membership on
both dimensions. Identifying either as ideologically right-wing or with the anti-EU UKIP
depressed both utilitarian and affective support substantially, and the opposite was true
for identifying as ideologically left-wing or with the more pro-EU Labour and Liberal
Democrat parties.
There are also some controls that had different effects on utilitarian and affective sup-
port. Age, while having a very weak effect, was signiﬁcantly and negatively associated
with utilitarian support but positively with affective support. The utilitarian coefﬁcient
is likely a reﬂection of the fact that older people are less likely to be in a position to take
advantage of many of the opportunities of EU membership because of their commitments
to work and family (Down and Wilson, 2017). It is unclear, however, why older people
would exhibit stronger affective support for EU membership given that they are typically
more eurosceptic (Fox and Pearce, 2018). A further important difference is apparent in the
effect of political engagement; those with more interest in politics had higher utilitarian
support but lower affective support, once their engagement with the referendum in partic-
ular was controlled for. Gabel (1998) and Hooghe and Marks (2005) suggest that people
with greater political engagement should be more supportive of EU membership because
of their greater familiarity with the role of the EU in domestic politics. A positive effect
from political interest on utilitarian support makes sense, therefore, but this cannot ex-
plain the negative effect on affective support. Unpicking precisely what is being captured
by this coefﬁcient would require further research that is beyond the scope of this study,
though it possibly reﬂects the persistently higher levels of euroscepticism exhibited by
UK citizens and the failure of the engaged British electorate to develop an affective
attachment to the European project in the way that citizens in other member states have.
Finally, Table 4 adds the utilitarian and affective measures of support to the referen-
dum vote choice model and tests the expectation that the effect of religion would disap-
pear once its impact on affective sentiments towards the EU were controlled for (H4).
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H4 is modiﬁed as the result of the rejection of H3 (that is, the ﬁnding that religious
afﬁliation affected utilitarian assessments of EU membership). It now stipulates that
controlling for affective and utilitarian support for EU membership should account for
the direct effect of religious afﬁliation on vote choice in Model IV.
Unsurprisingly, the results show that the more negative one’s utilitarian and affective
assessments of EU membership, the greater the probability of voting ‘leave’, with both
measures having negative and highly signiﬁcant effects. The effect of being Anglican
was greatly reduced and became non-signiﬁcant compared with that of Model I; the effect
of being Presbyterian was reversed (with a non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of 0.3); and the
effect of being Catholic remained non-signiﬁcant but was reduced notably in magnitude.
For the most part, the data support the modiﬁed H4: once the relationships between re-
ligious afﬁliation and utilitarian and affective sentiments towards the EU are accounted
Table 4: Vote choice in EU Referendum including utilitarian and affective support
Vote ‘Leave’ in EU Referendum Model IV
Coefﬁcient Standard Error
Religious group (None)
Anglican 0.07 0.15
Catholic 0.22 0.22
Presbyterian 0.30 0.29
Methodist 0.71* 0.35
Baptist 0.20 0.48
Other Christian 0.14 0.63
Non-Christian 0.01 0.27
Utilitarian 0.73‡ 0.04
Affective 1.16‡ 0.08
Age 0.03‡ 0.01
Working class ID 0.02 0.07
Female 0.04 0.12
EU-born 0.00 0.00
Non-white British 0.23 0.26
Graduate 0.57‡ 0.13
Left–right ideology 0.19‡ 0.04
Attention to politics 0.20‡ 0.04
No interest in Referendum 1.35* 0.63
Scotland 1.47‡ 0.20
Conservative ID 0.67‡ 0.19
Labour ID 1.12‡ 0.19
Lib Dem ID 1.80‡ 0.28
UKIP ID 4.87‡ 0.60
Constant 9.13‡ 0.71
Obs 11,138
Groups 9,195
Wald chi2(16) 322.11
Log Likelihood 3,177.23
Source: BES, Wave 7–9.
* effect statistically signiﬁcant at 95% conﬁdence level; † signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence level; ‡ signiﬁcant at 99.9% con-
ﬁdence level.
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for, there is no effect from religious afﬁliation on vote choice in the Referendum. The
exceptions are Baptists and Methodists: there was virtually no effect on their relative
probability of supporting ‘leave’ once utilitarian and affective sentiments were controlled
for, suggesting that their assessments of EU membership are driven by something that is
not captured by these two dimensions of support.
Conclusion
This research contributes to the literature highlighting the importance of religious afﬁlia-
tion and values in shaping one’s political attitudes and behaviour – in this case with re-
gard to EU membership and integration. It conﬁrms the importance of religion for
explaining support for Brexit in the UK’s referendum through a causal model and using
panel data. It also enhances our understanding of how religion affects support for the
EU by assessing support for utilitarian and affective dimensions of euroscepticism.
Finally, it challenges ﬁndings regarding the euroscepticism of Protestants by studying
smaller Protestant groups in the UK in their own right rather than as part of a larger ‘Prot-
estant’ bloc.
The study conﬁrms that as elsewhere in Europe, the UK’s Protestant groups with his-
torically close relationships to national government or national identity, such as the
Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, are more eurosceptic than
other Christians, non-Christians and the non-religious. This supports the theoretical ex-
pectation that the distinctive history and values of these Protestant groups has left them
with a lasting propensity to be more hostile towards EU integration (that is, to have lower
affective support for the EU) because of its impact on the sovereignty of national govern-
ments. Developing the existing literature further, however, this research has also shown
that there are important differences between Protestant groups, with smaller groups that
were persecuted by the national government and larger Protestant churches in the past be-
ing more supportive of EU membership. This challenges the assumption that Protestant
churches throughout Europe have a shared euroscepticism that sets them apart from
Catholics and the non-religious. Instead, the history and values of a speciﬁc Protestant
church are vital in shaping their relationship with the EU and in differentiating between
Protestant groups.
We also found that the particularly eurosceptic Protestants (Anglicans and Presbyte-
rians) are likely to have low utilitarian support for EU integration as well. This goes
against our expectations of the way religion should affect political support based on
existing literature. There are three likely explanations for this. First, the depth of their af-
fective hostility to the EU is so extensive that it inﬂuences their assessments of the EU’s
policy performance as well, in a comparable manner to the way having a strong partisan
attachment to a party that is not in government can colour the way people interpret the
policy performance of the government. Second, the distinction between affective and
utilitarian support is more subtle than assumed, meaning that there is more of a link, or
potentially a reciprocal relationship, between one’s affective attachments to the EU and
assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of membership. Finally, another possibility is that
the differences between Anglicans’ and Presbyterians’ policy priorities and those of other
Protestants, Catholics and the non-religious are more substantial than expected. Conse-
quently, it would be possible for the EU to meet the policy priorities of one group (such
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as Catholics) while failing to meet the priorities of the Anglicans or Presbyterians,
resulting in lower utilitarian support from the latter.
Investigating this unexpected ﬁnding further would be a fruitful avenue of further re-
search. In any case, the analysis conﬁrms that most Protestants’ hostility to EU integration
and membership is born out of their weak affective attachment to the institution, and their
negative assessments of its policy performance alongside the perceived costs of member-
ship. These results also challenge the widely held view that British Catholics typically
have stronger affective attachment to the EU than Protestants. The argument that the his-
tory and values of Catholicism make Catholics more likely to support the EU is plausible,
however British Catholics have more negative assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of EU
membership and weaker affective attachments once the fact that many were born outside
of the UK has been accounted for. This suggests either that there is something distinctive
about British Catholicism that makes them less supportive of the EU (although it is difﬁ-
cult to consider what that might be), or that the positive relationship between Catholicism
and support for EU integration in other European countries may well be a result of stron-
ger public support for the EU amongst particular communities that happen to have large
numbers of Catholics (such as supporters of the CPU in Germany), but that has little to do
with their religious identiﬁcation. Further research in other national contexts with large
numbers of Catholics is required to solve this conundrum.
The study also reveals an important ﬁnding regarding the non-religious, namely that
they tend to be more supportive of EU membership and integration than religious respon-
dents (though the differences are not large). Given that age is controlled for in the models,
this is not a function of the tendency of younger people to be both more supportive of EU
membership and not to afﬁliate with religion. Given that this group includes a diverse
range of respondents, it is difﬁcult to pin down precisely what is causing this more pro-
EU outlook. It may simply reﬂect the lack of the historical and value-based reasons to
be sceptical of EU integration exhibited by some Protestants, or a trait associated with be-
ing non-religious that affects other attitudes correlated with support for EU membership
that is not accounted for in the analyses, such as a distinct moral or ethical philosophy
not rooted in religious belief. It is impossible to explain this tendency from these data,
but this does highlight a further avenue of inquiry for explaining the relationship between
religion and euroscepticism, as understanding how the consequences of lacking a reli-
gious identity are related to euroscepticism is surely as important as understanding the
consequences of having such an identity.
The ﬁndings of this study have considerable implications for the future study of
euroscepticism. First, it is clear that religious afﬁliation is an important driver of support
for EU membership. Moreover, this research suggests that the effect is widespread, affect-
ing both utilitarian assessments and affective sentiment. A clear limitation of this study is
that the data are limited to the atypical case of the UK and during the referendum on EU
membership. While this does not undermine the validity of these ﬁndings regarding the
broader relationship between religion and euroscepticism, there is a need to corroborate
them in other contexts, should the data become available. Such research could explore
in more detail why religious afﬁliation affects both utilitarian and affective dimensions
of support, and consider whether this reﬂects the history and values of Protestantism
and Catholicism, or there is another explanation entirely that has yet to be considered
in the literature. Second, the importance of accounting for the multi-dimensional nature
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of euroscepticism is made clear. It is apparent that afﬁliation with different religious
groups, as well as age, political engagement and ideology, have different effects on util-
itarian and affective support for European integration. If these different dimensions are
not accounted for, these relationships will be obscured, producing potentially misleading
conclusions about the religious, social, economic and political predictors of support for
EU integration.
Finally, there are also implications from these ﬁndings for the broader understanding
of how religion affects political attitudes. Speciﬁcally, it re-opens the discussion regard-
ing the signiﬁcance and empirical application of social and political cleavages. Classic
cleavage theories emphasize the diminishing importance of religion in and growing
secularization of politics, especially in Europe, resulting from the separation of church
and state and increasing liberalization of social attitudes (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Norris
and Inglehart, 2004). Our empirical ﬁndings, however, suggest that announcing that
‘religion is dead’ is somewhat premature, as there are signiﬁcant effects from religious
afﬁliation on contemporary attitudes, such as euroscepticism. Moreover, that effect is
widespread, inﬂuencing both the way people identify with and attach to the EU, and
the way that they assess the costs and beneﬁts of membership and its policy performance.
In other words, religion has a signiﬁcant effect on the full range of factors voters take
into account when reaching a decision about their approval (or not) of EU membership.
While religious practice, belief and afﬁliation may be in decline, this does not mean that
the inﬂuence of denominational, self-identiﬁed religious membership on socio-political
attitudes and behaviour is declining or negligible, as the case of the UK’s 2016 Referen-
dum demonstrates.
This direction of research is important for both empirical and normative reasons.
Empirically, there is very little clarity in the literature regarding the explanations as to
why afﬁliation with a certain religious denomination inﬂuences political attitudes and
behaviours. Most of the explanations for these effects – in this and previous research
(see Clements, 2015; Nelsen and Guth, 2003; Tilley, 2015) – draw on the analysis of the
historical backgrounds, organizational structures, social and moral values of religious
groups (see Coupland, 2004; Madeley, 2007; McLeod, 1999;). However, there is a lot
more data on major Protestant groups and Catholics rather than minor groups such as
Methodists and Baptists, even though they might be dominant in speciﬁc localities and ca-
pable of swinging a result of an electoral poll in some constituencies. A ﬁner categorization
of religious groups (and the inclusion of those of no religion) and a more nuanced approach
to the analysis of the effect of religion building on the ever-increasing opportunities for
data linkage and big data analysis will eventually enable us to develop a more detailed
and precise explanatory models regarding the role of religion in politics. Normatively, that
would enable us to improve theories of religious engagement, their applicability to new
cases and forecasting potential by drawing on reliable and replicable empirical research.
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